Second best efficiency and the English auction
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Cites work
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- An Efficient Auction
- An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
- Asymmetric English auctions.
- Comparing location experiments
- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
- Integration by Parts for Stieltjes Integrals
- Monopoly and product quality
- On efficiency of the English auction
- Optimal Auction Design
Cited in
(10)- On the efficiency of the first price auction
- Inefficient rushes in auctions
- On efficiency of the English auction
- Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
- Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale
- Enforcement of resource allocation mechanisms and second best industrial policy
- Axiomatizations of second price auctions with a reserve price
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4035516 (Why is no real title available?)
- Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices
- On the optimality of not allocating
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