Second best efficiency and the English auction

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2011.04.003zbMATH Open1274.91226OpenAlexW3123506611MaRDI QIDQ645656FDOQ645656

Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Fabio Michelucci

Publication date: 10 November 2011

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/25361/1/25361.pdf

Recommendations

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zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymechanism designauctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Comparing location experiments
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Monopoly and product quality
• A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
• Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Efficient Auctions
• English auctions and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• An Efficient Auction
• An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
• On efficiency of the English auction
• Integration by Parts for Stieltjes Integrals

Cited In (7)

• On the efficiency of the first price auction
• On efficiency of the English auction
• Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies
• Enforcement of resource allocation mechanisms and second best industrial policy
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the optimality of not allocating
• Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices

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