Second best efficiency and the English auction
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Publication:645656
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2011.04.003zbMath1274.91226OpenAlexW3123506611MaRDI QIDQ645656
Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Fabio Michelucci
Publication date: 10 November 2011
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://dro.dur.ac.uk/25361/1/25361.pdf
Related Items (4)
Reduced form implementation for environments with value interdependencies ⋮ On the efficiency of the first price auction ⋮ Promoting entry and efficiency via reserve prices ⋮ On the optimality of not allocating
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- Efficient Auctions
- Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
- An Efficient Auction
- An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
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