A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms

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Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
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The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap
Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control
Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions
Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
Weak monotonicity and Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
The participatory Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
Public goods with congestion
Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting
Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
Asymmetric partnerships
Seller competition by mechanism design
The price of fairness with the extended Perles-Maschler solution
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Incentive compatible market design with applications
A general non-central hypergeometric distribution
Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries.
Assembly problems
Implementation theory
When queueing is better than push and shove
An efficient dynamic mechanism
Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply
When Walras meets Vickrey
Trade of a common value good
Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements
Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
Second best efficiency and the English auction
Collective decision through an informed mediator
On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
Efficient incentives with social preferences
Efficient bilateral trade with interdependent values: the use of two-stage mechanisms
Public goods, social alternatives, and the Lindahl-VCG relationship
Ideal default for resolving disputes efficiently
Multibidding game under uncertainty
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Universal possibility and impossibility results
On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism
Individually rational, budget-balanced mechanisms and allocation of surplus

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