A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms

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Second best efficiency and the English auction
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A heuristic optimization of Bayesian incentive-compatible cake-cutting
Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
Mechanism design for land acquisition
Bargaining mechanisms for one-way games
On incentive compatibility in dynamic mechanism design with exit option in a Markovian environment
Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
Asymmetric partnerships
Asymptotically optimal prior-free clock auctions
A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights
A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
When queueing is better than push and shove
Efficient dissolution of partnerships and the structure of control
On the uniqueness of Groves mechanisms and the payoff equivalence principle
Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
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A general non-central hypergeometric distribution
Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
Coalition-proof full efficient implementation
Universal possibility and impossibility results
The deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction is at least as large as the Walrasian price gap
On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms
On budget balance of the dynamic pivot mechanism
Bayesian and weakly robust first best mechanisms: Characterizations
A note on linked bargaining
The modified Vickrey double auction
Ex post efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction when demand can be arbitrarily larger than supply
Endogenous contest success functions: a mechanism design approach
Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
Multibidding game under uncertainty
Public goods with congestion
A dominant-strategy asset market mechanism
Implementation theory
Posterior efficiency
Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
Incentive-compatible simple mechanisms
Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
Learning equilibrium in bilateral bargaining games
Seller competition by mechanism design
Convergence of VCG mechanism to ex-post budget balance in a model of land acquisition
Design and analysis of mechanisms for decentralized joint replenishment
Bayesian incentive compatible parametrization of mechanisms
Efficient bilateral trade via two-stage mechanisms: comparison between one-sided and two-sided asymmetric information environments
Monotonicity and revenue equivalence domains by monotonic transformations in differences
Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments
Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions
Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements
Ready to trade? On budget-balanced efficient trade with uncertain arrival
On the existence of efficient multilateral trading mechanisms with interdependent values
Trade of a common value good
Brief Announcement: Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries.
When Walras meets Vickrey
Collective decision through an informed mediator
Efficient incentives with social preferences
Assembly problems

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