Seller competition by mechanism design
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Publication:453209
DOI10.1007/S00199-010-0597-ZzbMATH Open1247.91072OpenAlexW2136254210MaRDI QIDQ453209FDOQ453209
Authors: Damian S. Damianov 
Publication date: 18 September 2012
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-010-0597-z
Recommendations
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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Cited In (13)
- Capacity and entry issues in online exchanges
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Competing first-price and second-price auctions
- Equilibrium mechanisms in a decentralized market
- An equilibrium analysis of competing double auction marketplaces using fictitious play
- Sellers like clusters
- A model of competing selling mechanisms
- What type of contract should e-tailers offer sellers when facing internal competition
- A model of parallel contests
- On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Surplus extraction and competition
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