Recommendations
Cites work
- A Competitive Distribution of Auctions
- A characterization of efficient, Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms
- A revelation principle for competing mechanisms
- An experimental comparison of two search models
- Auction design with opportunity cost
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Auctions with endogenous entry
- Commitment in sequential auctioning: Advance listings and threshold prices
- Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
- Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
- Competition among sellers who offer auctions instead of prices
- Competition in transactions mechanisms: The emergence of price competition
- Competitive bidding with entry costs
- Dynamic Matching, Two-Sided Incomplete Information, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition
- Matching and bargaining models of markets: approximating small markets by large markets
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
- Optimal auctions revisited
- Pricing, learning, and strategic behavior in a single-sale model
- Second chance offers versus sequential auctions: theory and behavior
- Sorting versus screening: search frictions and competing mechanisms
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
- The rate at which a simple market converges to efficiency as the number of traders increases: An asymptotic result for optimal trading mechanisms
- The rate of convergence to perfect competition of matching and bargaining mechanisms
- What model for entry in first-price auctions? A nonparametric approach
Cited in
(19)- Equilibrium mechanisms in a decentralized market
- Sellers like clusters
- A model of parallel contests
- What type of contract should e-tailers offer sellers when facing internal competition
- MEETINGS AND MECHANISMS
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5010825 (Why is no real title available?)
- Competing mechanisms with multi-unit consumer demand
- A model of competing selling mechanisms
- Surplus extraction and competition
- Who wants to be an auctioneer?
- Competing first-price and second-price auctions
- On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete
- An equilibrium analysis of competing double auction marketplaces using fictitious play
- Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers
- Search frictions, competing mechanisms and optimal market segmentation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 853111 (Why is no real title available?)
- Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets
- Capacity and entry issues in online exchanges
- General competing mechanism games with strategy-proof punishment
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