Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
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Publication:938053
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2007.09.001zbMATH Open1140.91366OpenAlexW2106500427MaRDI QIDQ938053FDOQ938053
Authors: Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela, Xianwen Shi 
Publication date: 18 August 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.001
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
Cites Work
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Cited In (19)
- Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities
- Auctions of divisible goods with endogenous supply
- Capacity and entry issues in online exchanges
- Auctions of homogeneous goods: game-theoretic analysis
- Auction timing and market thickness
- An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions
- College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized
- Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- Endogenous bid rotation in repeated auctions
- Seller competition by mechanism design
- Rubinstein auctions: On competition for bargaining partners
- Auctions with endogenous entry
- Competing auctions with non-identical objects
- A model of parallel contests
- Competing auctions: finite markets and convergence
- Endogenous Two-Sided Markets with Repeated Transactions
- Optimal advertising of auctions
- Performance bounds for optimal sales mechanisms beyond the monotone hazard rate condition
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