Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
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Publication:938053
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.001zbMath1140.91366OpenAlexW2106500427MaRDI QIDQ938053
Xianwen Shi, Benny Moldovanu, Aner Sela
Publication date: 18 August 2008
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.09.001
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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