An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.01.023zbMATH Open1253.91077OpenAlexW2014652692MaRDI QIDQ1925686FDOQ1925686

Fredrik Andersson, Tommy Andersson, Christer Andersson

Publication date: 18 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://project.nek.lu.se/Publications/workpap/Papers/WP10_14.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencycompeting auctionscross-biddingprice uniformity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Competing auctions with endogenous quantities
• Internet auctions with many traders

Cited In (11)

• Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
• Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
• Effects of competition in first-price auctions
• Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism
• Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply -- experimental evidence
• When Fixed Price Meets Priority Auctions: Competing Firms with Different Pricing and Service Rules
• Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
• On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
• On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete
• Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs
• Imperfect competition in online auctions

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