An empirical investigation of efficiency and price uniformity in competing auctions
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Publication:1925686
Recommendations
- Reserve price efficiency and competitive pressure in auctions
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Cited in
(11)- Industry concentration in common value auctions: theory and evidence
- Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency
- Effects of competition in first-price auctions
- Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
- On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
- Explaining deviations from equilibrium in auctions with avoidable fixed costs
- On the unprofitability of buyer groups when sellers compete
- Uniform vs. discriminatory auctions with variable supply -- experimental evidence
- When Fixed Price Meets Priority Auctions: Competing Firms with Different Pricing and Service Rules
- Bidding Behavior and Equilibrium Excursion of Uniform Price Auction Mechanism
- Imperfect competition in online auctions
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