On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2019.108918zbMATH Open1431.91160OpenAlexW2996636370MaRDI QIDQ2295367FDOQ2295367

Authors: Xiaoyong Cao, Shao-Chieh Hsueh, Wei Wang 

Publication date: 13 February 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2019.108918

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zbMATH Keywords

stabilityfirst-price auctionsparticipation costsefficient cartel mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Asymmetric Auctions
• Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions.
• Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
• Ratifiable mechanisms: Learning from disagreement
• Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs

Cited In (1)

• The study on the collusion mechanism of auction and it's efficiency

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