On the efficiency of the first price auction

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2017.05.003MaRDI QIDQ1673553zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ángel Hernando-Veciana, Fabio Michelucci

Publication date 12 September 2018

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://dro.dur.ac.uk/25347/1/25347.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyfirst price auctionEnglish auctionprivatizations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Asymmetric Auctions
• Asymmetric English auctions.
• Inefficient rushes in auctions
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Second best efficiency and the English auction
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Uniqueness of the equilibrium in first-price auctions

Cited in

(15)

• Effects of competition in first-price auctions
• Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
• A comparison of first price multi-object auctions
• On efficiency of the English auction
• First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
• A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions
• Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab
• Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions
• Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
• A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
• The Affiliation Effect in First-Price Auctions
• On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
• Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
• Framing the first-price auction
• First‐price auctions with budget constraints

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