On the efficiency of the first price auction
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Publication:1673553
Cites work
Cited in
(15)- Effects of competition in first-price auctions
- Existence of an equilibrium in first price auctions
- A comparison of first price multi-object auctions
- On efficiency of the English auction
- First-Price Auctions With General Information Structures: Implications for Bidding and Revenue
- A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions
- Implementing the efficient auction: initial results from the lab
- Procuring substitutes with (fine-tuned) first-price auctions
- Efficiency of lowest-unmatched price auctions
- A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
- The Affiliation Effect in First-Price Auctions
- On stability of efficient cartel mechanisms in first-price auctions with uninformed bidders
- Tests of a heterogeneous bidders theory of first price auctions
- Framing the first-price auction
- First‐price auctions with budget constraints
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