A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
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Publication:607262
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.08.003zbMATH Open1200.91119OpenAlexW2189049416MaRDI QIDQ607262FDOQ607262
Stergios Athanassoglou, Jay Sethuraman, Steven J. Brams
Publication date: 19 November 2010
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.003
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- Generic inefficiency of stock market equilibrium when markets are incomplete
Cites Work
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Incentives in Teams
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
- Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.
- Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
- Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
Cited In (9)
- A Tale of Two Shares: Why Two-Share Threshold Implementation Seems Worthwhile—and Why It Is Not
- A simple result for the revenue in share auctions.
- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
- Optimal Value Declaration in “Buy-Sell” Situations
- Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
- On the dissolution of three-party partnerships via a buy-sell mechanism
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