A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2010.08.003MaRDI QIDQ607262zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stergios Athanassoglou, Steven J. Brams, Jay Sethuraman

Publication date 19 November 2010

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.08.003

zbMATH Keywords

double auctionpartnership dissolutionex-post efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
• Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
• Auctions with price-proportional benefits to bidders
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Incentives in Teams
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
• Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
• Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade.

Cited in

(13)

• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Value of the status quo and efficient partnership dissolution
• Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
• Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
• A Tale of Two Shares: Why Two-Share Threshold Implementation Seems Worthwhile—and Why It Is Not
• Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
• Optimal Value Declaration in “Buy-Sell” Situations
• A simple result for the revenue in share auctions.
• Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: an experimental study
• Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
• On the dissolution of three-party partnerships via a buy-sell mechanism
• Dissolving a partnership dynamically
• Asymmetric price-benefits auctions

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