Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90083-TMaRDI QIDQ1190243zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors R. Preston McAfee

Publication date 27 September 1992

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

ex post efficiencysimple mechanismsinterim expected utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Divide and compromise
• A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
• Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Fair division with indivisible commodities

Cited in

(31)

• An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure
• Fairness and inefficient divorce
• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
• Smooth multibidding mechanisms
• The effectiveness of English auctions.
• Dissolving a partnership securely
• Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
• The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty
• Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
• Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value
• An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
• Divide and compromise
• Partnership dissolution: information and efficiency
• Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
• When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
• A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
• Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
• A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
• At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency
• Bribing in second-price auctions
• Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
• On the dissolution of three-party partnerships via a buy-sell mechanism
• Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
• Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
• Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
• The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
• Dissolving a partnership dynamically
• Partnerships of bidders with constant relative risk aversions
• Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers
• Asymmetric price-benefits auctions

This page was built for publication: Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1190243)