Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90083-TzbMATH Open0763.90035WikidataQ122874268 ScholiaQ122874268MaRDI QIDQ1190243FDOQ1190243

Authors: R. Preston McAfee 

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Recommendations

• Dissolving a partnership (un)fairly
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• Divide and compromise
• A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
• Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently

zbMATH Keywords

ex post efficiencysimple mechanismsinterim expected utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
• Fair division with indivisible commodities

Cited In (31)

• The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems
• Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers
• Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
• Dissolving (in)effective partnerships
• Partnership dissolution and proprietary information
• Dissolving multi-partnerships efficiently
• Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value
• The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty
• An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure
• Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations.
• Dissolving a partnership securely
• An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games
• A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation
• Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge
• Approximating gains-from-trade in bilateral trading
• Fairness and inefficient divorce
• Dissolving a partnership dynamically
• Smooth multibidding mechanisms
• When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships
• Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
• A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share
• Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
• (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Bribing in second-price auctions
• Partnership dissolution: information and efficiency
• The effectiveness of English auctions.
• Partnerships of bidders with constant relative risk aversions
• Asymmetric price-benefits auctions
• Divide and compromise
• At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency
• On the dissolution of three-party partnerships via a buy-sell mechanism

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