Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90083-TzbMath0763.90035WikidataQ122874268 ScholiaQ122874268MaRDI QIDQ1190243

R. Preston McAfee

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

ex post efficiencysimple mechanismsinterim expected utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (27)

Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge ⋮ Dissolving a partnership dynamically ⋮ Dissolving a partnership securely ⋮ A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share ⋮ (Almost) efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading ⋮ Divide and compromise ⋮ Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers ⋮ The effectiveness of English auctions. ⋮ When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships ⋮ On the dissolution of three-party partnerships via a buy-sell mechanism ⋮ Approximating Gains-from-Trade in Bilateral Trading ⋮ Partnerships and double auctions with interdependent valuations. ⋮ Partnership Dissolution: Information and Efficiency ⋮ Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values ⋮ Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources ⋮ Partnership dissolution and proprietary information ⋮ Dissolving (in)effective partnerships ⋮ Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions ⋮ Allocating positions fairly: auctions and Shapley value ⋮ At-will relationships: how an option to walk away affects cooperation and efficiency ⋮ An indirect evolutionary justification of risk neutral bidding in fair division games ⋮ Smooth multibidding mechanisms ⋮ Bribing in second-price auctions ⋮ A nonparametric, efficient public good decision mechanism: Undominated Bayesian implementation ⋮ Asymmetric price-benefits auctions ⋮ An equilibrium analysis of Knaster's fair division procedure ⋮ The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Fair division with indivisible commodities
• Efficient allocation with continuous quantities
• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

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