The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6584583
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.04.009zbMATH Open1546.91099MaRDI QIDQ6584583FDOQ6584583
Authors: Gerrit Bauch, Frank Riedel
Publication date: 8 August 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- A Smooth Model of Decision Making under Ambiguity
- Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
- Recursive multiple-priors.
- Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
- Sequential Equilibria
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Mechanism design with ambiguous communication devices
- Kuhn's theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games
- Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the Matthew effect catalyzing?
- A note on Kuhn's theorem with ambiguity averse players
- Ellsberg games
- A moving-knife solution to the four-person envy-free cake-division problem
- An Envy-Free Cake Division Protocol
- The design of ambiguous mechanisms
- Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade
- Efficient allocation of a ``prize --- King Solomon's dilemma
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A note on stochastic dominance, uniform integrability and lattice properties
- Dissolving a partnership securely
- Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: the unassigned-offeror problem
- Dynamic consistency in incomplete information games with multiple priors
This page was built for publication: The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6584583)