Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the Matthew effect catalyzing?

DOI10.1007/BF01237524zbMATH Open0865.90013OpenAlexW2009780806MaRDI QIDQ2564142FDOQ2564142

Authors: Reinhilde Veugelers, Katrien Kesteloot 

Publication date: 6 July 1997

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01237524

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetrysharing rulesjoint ventures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Cites Work

• Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures
• University competition and transnational education: the choice of branch campus

Cited In (11)

• Asymmetric new product development alliances: win-win or win-lose partnerships?
• Optimality of the 51:49 equity structure
• The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty
• Conditions for asymmetric information solutions when alliances provide acquisition options and due diligence
• R\&D cooperation in emerging industries, asymmetric innovative capabilities and rationale for technology parks
• Collaboration in R{\&}D activities: firm-specific decisions
• Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners
• Optimal patent policy, research joint ventures, and growth
• Research joint ventures: A cooperative game for competitors
• Asymmetric R\&D alliances and coopetitive games
• The evolution of cooperation in patent races:Theory and experimental evidence

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