Bargained shares in joint ventures among asymmetric partners: Is the Matthew effect catalyzing?

DOI10.1007/BF01237524zbMath0865.90013OpenAlexW2009780806MaRDI QIDQ2564142

Katrien Kesteloot, Reinhilde Veugelers

Publication date: 6 July 1997

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01237524

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetryjoint venturessharing rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

Related Items (6)

Optimal patent policy, research joint ventures, and growth ⋮ R\&D cooperation in emerging industries, asymmetric innovative capabilities and rationale for technology parks ⋮ Collaboration in R{\&}D activities: firm-specific decisions ⋮ Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners ⋮ Research joint ventures: A cooperative game for competitors ⋮ The evolution of cooperation in patent races:Theory and experimental evidence

Cites Work

• Licensing and the sharing of knowledge in research joint ventures
• University competition and transnational education: the choice of branch campus

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