Conditions for asymmetric information solutions when alliances provide acquisition options and due diligence

DOI10.1007/S00712-003-0061-7MaRDI QIDQ1766932zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Richard J. Arend

Publication date 3 March 2005

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-003-0061-7

zbMATH Keywords

acquisitionalliancedue diligenceinformation hazards

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80)

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