Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: the unassigned-offeror problem

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2013.09.016MaRDI QIDQ2453039zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Claudia M. Landeo, Kathryn E. Spier

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12967824

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationbusiness deadlockexperimentsshotgun mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• A Game of Fair Division
• How to divide the possession of a football?

Cited in

(2)

• Which mechanisms support the fulfillment of sales agreements? Asking decision-makers in firms.
• The Texas shoot-out under Knightian uncertainty

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