The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
From MaRDI portal
Recommendations
- The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and nonexpected utility: A testable approach
- An augmented Becker-DeGroot-marschak mechanism for transaction cycles
- Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
- Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
- Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
Cites work
- "Expected Utility" Analysis without the Independence Axiom
- "Preference Reversal" and the Observability of Preferences by Experimental Methods
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
- A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
- Dominance Axioms and Multivariate Nonexpected Utility Preferences
- Generalized Expected Utility Analysis of Multivariate Risk Aversion
- Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design
Cited in
(7)- Entitlement and the efficiency-equality trade-off: an experimental study
- Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: money ain't no good
- Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: the unassigned-offeror problem
- An augmented Becker-DeGroot-marschak mechanism for transaction cycles
- Reference dependence, expectations and anchoring in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism
- Bidding behaviour in experimental auctions under risk and uncertainty
- The Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism and nonexpected utility: A testable approach
This page was built for publication: The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1929438)