Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: money ain't no good
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Publication:2416643
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.014zbMATH Open1411.91262OpenAlexW3023213847WikidataQ128243351 ScholiaQ128243351MaRDI QIDQ2416643FDOQ2416643
Authors: Antonio Rosato, Agnieszka A. Tymula 
Publication date: 24 May 2019
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://econ-wpseries.com/2016/201609.pdf
Recommendations
- English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
- Loss aversion in sequential auctions
- Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
- The loser's bliss in auctions with price externality
- Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
- Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
- Expectations-based loss aversion in contests
- The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
Cites Work
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice
- A model of reference-dependent preferences
- A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
- Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
- Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty
- Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty
- Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: theory and experiments
- On the validity of the random lottery incentive system
- The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
Cited In (7)
- English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
- Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
- Reference dependence, expectations and anchoring in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism
- Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
- The willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity in repeated markets: loss aversion or ``bad-deal aversion?
- Loss aversion in sequential auctions
- Disappointment aversion in internet bidding-decisions
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