Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: money ain't no good

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.02.014MaRDI QIDQ2416643zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Antonio Rosato, Agnieszka A. Tymula

Publication date 24 May 2019

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://econ-wpseries.com/2016/201609.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsexpectationsloss aversionreference-dependent preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
• Loss aversion in sequential auctions
• Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
• The loser's bliss in auctions with price externality
• Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
• Expectations-based loss aversion in contests
• The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions

Cites work

• A model of reference-dependent preferences
• A Theory of Disappointment Aversion
• Disappointment and Dynamic Consistency in Choice under Uncertainty
• Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
• On the validity of the random lottery incentive system
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Sealed bid auctions with ambiguity: theory and experiments
• The Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism is not necessarily incentive compatible, even for non-random goods
• The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice

Cited in

(10)

• English versus Vickrey auctions with loss-averse bidders
• Multi-dimensional reference-dependent preferences in sealed-bid auctions -- how (most) laboratory experiments differ from the field
• Loss aversion in sequential auctions
• Auctions with loss‐averse bidders
• The willingness-to-accept/willingness-to-pay disparity in repeated markets: loss aversion or ``bad-deal aversion?
• Reference dependence, expectations and anchoring in the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism
• Never say never: optimal exclusion and reserve prices with expectations-based loss-averse buyers
• Bidding behaviour in experimental auctions under risk and uncertainty
• Asymmetric optimal auction design with loss-averse bidders
• Disappointment aversion in internet bidding-decisions

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

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