Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
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Publication:2642884
DOI10.1007/S00199-006-0180-9zbMATH Open1122.91030OpenAlexW2024075356MaRDI QIDQ2642884FDOQ2642884
Authors: Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Elena Katok 
Publication date: 6 September 2007
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0180-9
Recommendations
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)
Cites Work
- Computationally manageable combinational auctions
- Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
- Auctions of homogeneous goods with increasing returns: experimental comparison of alternative ``Dutch auctions
- Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
- Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
- Just who are you calling risk averse?
Cited In (41)
- Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium
- Explaining overbidding in first price auctions using controlled lotteries
- Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret
- Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: money ain't no good
- Robust monopoly pricing
- An introduction to the Symposium on behavioral game theory
- Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
- Knowing me, imagining you: projection and overbidding in auctions
- Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders
- Informed entry in auctions
- Step-level reasoning and bidding in auctions
- Dynamic Purchase Decisions Under Regret: Price and Availability
- The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions
- Contests with rank-order spillovers
- The impact of consumer's regret on firms' decisions in a durable good market
- Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game
- Auctions with anticipated emotions: overbidding, underbidding, and optimal reserve prices
- Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions
- Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction
- Ex-post regret heuristics under private values. I: Fixed and random matching
- Goodwill can hurt: a theoretical and experimental investigation of return policies in auctions
- Ranking blame
- The spite motive in third price auctions
- Bilevel approach for e-bidding auction with regret theory
- Does regret matter in first-price auctions?
- Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback
- The sunk-cost fallacy in penny auctions
- On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
- Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory
- Revenue equivalence revisited
- Spite and reciprocity in auctions
- Anticipated regret as an explanation of uncertainty aversion
- Joint inventory, pricing, and advertising decisions with surplus and stockout loss aversions
- Auction revenue in the general spiteful-utility model
- Dual sourcing with price discovery
- Spite vs. risk: explaining overbidding in the second-price all-pay auction. A theoretical and experimental investigation
- Anticipated loser regret in third price auctions
- Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence
- Emotional Bidders—An Analytical and Experimental Examination of Consumers' Behavior in a Priceline-Like Reverse Auction
- Maximization, learning, and economic behavior
- Bidding in private-value auctions with uncertain values
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