Regret in auctions: theory and evidence

DOI10.1007/s00199-006-0180-9zbMath1122.91030OpenAlexW2024075356MaRDI QIDQ2642884

Elena Katok, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans

Publication date: 6 September 2007

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0180-9

zbMATH Keywords

learningauctionsexperimental economicsrisk-aversionregretcompetitive bidding

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items

Reverse auctions with regret-anticipated bidders ⋮ An introduction to the Symposium on behavioral game theory ⋮ Does regret matter in first-price auctions? ⋮ Varying the number of bidders in the first-price sealed-bid auction: experimental evidence for the one-shot game ⋮ Dual sourcing with price discovery ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for first‐price sealed‐bid auctions ⋮ Adversarial risk analysis for auctions using non-strategic play and level-k thinking: A general case of n bidders with regret ⋮ Robust inference in first-price auctions: overbidding as an identifying restriction ⋮ Maximization, learning, and economic behavior ⋮ Anticipated regret as an explanation of uncertainty aversion ⋮ On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality ⋮ Robust monopoly pricing ⋮ Joint inventory, pricing, and advertising decisions with surplus and stockout loss aversions ⋮ Bidding `as if' risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback ⋮ Knowing me, imagining you: projection and overbidding in auctions ⋮ Informed entry in auctions ⋮ Revenue equivalence revisited ⋮ Behavioral models for first-price sealed-bid auctions with the one-shot decision theory ⋮ Contests with rank-order spillovers ⋮ Auctions with external incentives: experimental evidence ⋮ Adversarial Risk Analysis for Auctions Using Mirror Equilibrium and Bayes Nash Equilibrium

Cites Work

• Individual behavior of first-price auctions: the importance of information feedback in computerized experimental markets
• Just who are you calling risk averse?
• Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions
• Computationally Manageable Combinational Auctions
• Auctions of Homogeneous Goods with Increasing Returns: Experimental Comparison of Alternative “Dutch” Auctions
• Regret and Feedback Information in First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
• The Effect of Regret on Optimal Bidding in Auctions