Revenue equivalence revisited

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2008.01.003zbMATH Open1152.91464OpenAlexW2570605012MaRDI QIDQ952771FDOQ952771

Authors: Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Timothy C. Salmon 

Publication date: 14 November 2008

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/13376/

Recommendations

• Sealed bid auctions versus ascending bid auctions: an experimental study
• Auctions with selective entry
• A comparison of first price multi-object auctions
• Equivalence and revenue comparison among identical-item auctions
• Revenue ranking of first-price auctions with resale

zbMATH Keywords

ascending auctionsendogenous entryprivate valuesbidder preferencessealed bid auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Entry coordination in auctions and social welfare: An experimental investigation
• Optimal Auction Design
• Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Optimal auctions revisited
• Ranking auctions with risk adverse bidders

Cited In (7)

• Informed entry in auctions
• Competing first-price and second-price auctions
• On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions
• Equivalent LLTMS: a rejoinder
• Do preferences for charitable giving help auctioneers?
• Innovation contests with entry auction
• Auction fever: rising revenue in second-price auction formats

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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