On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions

DOI10.1007/BF00133162MaRDI QIDQ1108169zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Edi Karni

Publication date 1988

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133162

zbMATH Keywords

descending bid auctionsexpected utility maximizing behaviorfirst price sealed bid auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16)

Recommendations

• Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences
• On the strictly descending multi-unit auction
• Equilibrium bidding without the independence axiom: A graphical analysis
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Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Ascending bid auctions with behaviorally consistent bidders
• Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences

Cited in

(10)

• Equivalence of auctions and posted prices
• Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk
• Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders
• Behavioral mechanism design: evidence from the modified first-price auctions
• Robust bidding and revenue in descending price auctions
• Dutch vs. first-price auctions with expectations-based loss-averse bidders
• Information acquisition during a descending auction
• Inverse S-shaped probability weighting functions in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Revenue effects of ambiguity in multi-unit auctions
• A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity

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