Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00054-XzbMath1031.91040MaRDI QIDQ1607272

Oscar Volij

Publication date: 31 July 2002

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Non-expected utility; Risk aversion; Auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity, On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes., Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders

Cites Work

• Vickrey auctions in the theory of expected utility with rank-dependent probabilities
• Ascending bid auctions with behaviorally consistent bidders
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions
• Sealed bid auctions with uncertainty averse bidders
• Stop-loss order for portfolios of dependent risks
• Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
• Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
• Dynamic Consistency, Revelations in Auctions and the Structure of Preferences
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design
• The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk