Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions
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Publication:2365168
DOI10.1007/BF01067681zbMath0860.90043OpenAlexW2076988222MaRDI QIDQ2365168
Publication date: 21 April 1997
Published in: Journal of Risk and Uncertainty (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01067681
Choquet expected utilityfirst-price sealed-bid auctionsNash-equilibrium predictionsrisk-neutral bidders
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Cites Work
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- The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
