Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders
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Publication:1886295
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.007zbMath1099.91051OpenAlexW2062588709MaRDI QIDQ1886295
Publication date: 18 November 2004
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.007
Related Items (25)
On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry ⋮ Dynamic equilibrium with randomly arriving players ⋮ Optimal minimum bids and inventory scrapping in sequential, single-unit, Vickrey auctions with demand learning ⋮ Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective ⋮ On the sub-optimality of entry fees in auctions with entry ⋮ Optimal starting price for eBay-like online auctions ⋮ Population uncertainty and revealing contestants ⋮ Contests with group size uncertainty: experimental evidence ⋮ Design of discrete Dutch auctions with consideration of time ⋮ Dual auctions for assigning winners and compensating losers ⋮ Ambiguous beliefs and mechanism design ⋮ Ambiguous act equilibria ⋮ Auctions with a random number of identical bidders ⋮ The fog of fraud -- mitigating fraud by strategic ambiguity ⋮ On dynamic games with randomly arriving players ⋮ Design of discrete Dutch auctions with an uncertain number of bidders ⋮ Hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs ⋮ Sequential auctions with ambiguity ⋮ Contests between groups of unknown size ⋮ Recursive non-expected utility: connecting ambiguity attitudes to risk preferences and the level of ambiguity ⋮ Final-offer arbitration with uncertainty averse parties ⋮ Reserve price signaling in first-price auctions with an uncertain number of bidders ⋮ Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry ⋮ Contests with a stochastic number of players ⋮ Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry
Cites Work
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