Vickrey auctions in the theory of expected utility with rank-dependent probabilities

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90071-6zbMath1328.91128OpenAlexW2046123045WikidataQ57927161 ScholiaQ57927161MaRDI QIDQ899727

Zvi Safra, Edi Karni

Publication date: 1 January 2016

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90071-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (8)

Dynamic consistency, valuable information and subjective beliefs ⋮ Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders ⋮ A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity ⋮ Consequentialist foundations for expected utility ⋮ On games under expected utility with rank dependent probabilities ⋮ Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility ⋮ An experimental investigation of the impact of ambiguity on the valuation of self-insurance and self-protection ⋮ Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk

Cites Work

• Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• "Preference Reversal" and the Observability of Preferences by Experimental Methods
• The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk

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