Vickrey auctions in the theory of expected utility with rank-dependent probabilities

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(86)90071-6MaRDI QIDQ899727zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Edi Karni, Zvi Safra

Publication date 1 January 2016

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(86)90071-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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Cites work

• "Preference Reversal" and the Observability of Preferences by Experimental Methods
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
• Two-Stage Lotteries without the Reduction Axiom

Cited in

(14)

• Consequentialist foundations for expected utility
• Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility
• Second price auctions without expected utility
• On Vickrey-type auction procedures
• Properties of bid and ask reservation prices in the rank-dependent expected utility model
• Payoff equivalence in sealed bid auctions and the dual theory of choice under risk
• An experimental investigation of the impact of ambiguity on the valuation of self-insurance and self-protection
• Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders
• On games under expected utility with rank dependent probabilities
• Knightian analysis of the Vickrey mechanism
• Bidding to the Top: VCG and Equilibria of Position-Based Auctions
• Bidding behaviour in experimental auctions under risk and uncertainty
• Dynamic consistency, valuable information and subjective beliefs
• A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity

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