Delayed agreements and nonexpected utility

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(91)90013-5zbMath0753.90017WikidataQ57928810 ScholiaQ57928810MaRDI QIDQ1198175

Zvi Safra, Chaim Fershtman, Daniel R. Vincent

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/867.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Hicks paradox; inefficient delays

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

Dynamic consistency, consequentialism and reduction of compound lotteries

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