On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry
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Publication:2358569
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.01.006zbMath1395.91220OpenAlexW3123012443MaRDI QIDQ2358569
Bo Chen, Xiandeng Jiang, Dmitriy Knyazev
Publication date: 15 June 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.01.006
Related Items (9)
All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Two-stage contests with preferences over style ⋮ Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion ⋮ Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry ⋮ On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result ⋮ On the effects of bid caps in all-pay auctions ⋮ Optimal information exchange in contests ⋮ Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry ⋮ Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry
Cites Work
- Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
- Contests with a stochastic number of players
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders
- Private versus complete information in auctions
- Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
- Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
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