Optimal information exchange in contests
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Publication:2237879
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2021.102518zbMATH Open1476.91067OpenAlexW3155656022MaRDI QIDQ2237879FDOQ2237879
Authors: Zhuoqiong (Charlie) Chen 
Publication date: 28 October 2021
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102518
Recommendations
- Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
- Information in Tullock contests
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- Differential treatment and the winner's effort in contests with incomplete information
- Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) 2-person games (91A05) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)
Cites Work
- Strategy and dynamics in contests
- Information Sharing in Oligopoly
- Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
- Private versus complete information in auctions
- Multidimensional private value auctions
- Political disagreement and information in elections
- Collusive communication schemes in a first-price auction
- A general model of information sharing in oligopoly
- Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
- Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
- All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
- Communication of preferences in contests for contracts
- The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective
- Information sharing in a contest game with group identity
- Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
- On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry
- Handbook of game theory and industrial organization. Volume I: Theory
- A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information
- Information sharing in private value lottery contest
Cited In (7)
- Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests
- Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
- Information sharing in private value lottery contest
- Knowing your opponents: information disclosure and auction design
- All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
- Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion
- Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
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