Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2022.110314MaRDI QIDQ2126207zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Zhewei Wang, Lixue Zhou

Publication date 14 April 2022

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110314

zbMATH Keywords

information disclosureone-sided incomplete informationsequential contestssimultaneous contests

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Recommendations

• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Partial information disclosure in a contest
• Information disclosure on the contest mechanism
• The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective
• Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities

Cites work

• Partial information disclosure in a contest
• Sequential lottery contests with multiple participants
• The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry: a Bayesian persuasion perspective

Cited in

(8)

• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Diversification and information in contests
• Optimal information exchange in contests
• Partial information disclosure in a contest
• Long information design
• Information sharing in private value lottery contest
• Designing dynamic contests
• Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests

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