Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.10.014MaRDI QIDQ2345252zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Qiang Fu, Qian Jiao, Jingfeng Lu

Publication date 19 May 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.10.014

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionconcealmentdisclosurestochastic abilities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry
• Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry
• Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry
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Cites work

• All-Pay Contests
• Contest architecture
• Contests with a stochastic number of players
• Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests
• Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
• Private versus complete information in auctions

Cited in

(19)

• Information sharing in private value lottery contest
• Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types
• Information disclosure in sequential (and simultaneous) contests
• Information sharing in a contest game with group identity
• Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs
• Information disclosure on the contest mechanism
• Optimal information exchange in contests
• Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry
• On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry
• Two-stage contests with preferences over style
• Disclosure policies in all‐pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion
• Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
• Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types
• On disclosure of participation in innovation contests: a dominance result
• Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Sequential elimination in multi-stage all-pay auctions
• Voluntary disclosure in asymmetric contests
• Disclosure policies in research contests with stochastic entry
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values

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