Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102867MaRDI QIDQ6170040zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jingfeng Lu, Hongkun Ma, Zhewei Wang

Publication date 15 August 2023

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102867

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontestscorrelated typesinformation disclosurepure/mixed strategy equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Review text

The main results of this paper are obtained in a relatively restrictive model involving two players with binary correlated types. More precisely, the authors analyze a two-player contest model with correlated types in which contestants who observe their own types privately in the second stage (after entering the contest) choose their disclosure policies in the first stage (prior to the contest). It is shown that: -- if players' types are positively correlated, there is a partial disclosure equilibrium in which exactly one player chooses \(D\) (disclosure) on the other chooses \(C\) (concealment); -- if players' types are negatively correlated, we will have a no-disclosure equilibrium in which both players choose \(C\). The proofs of the propositions are given in the Appendix.

Recommendations

• A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information
• Information sharing in private value lottery contest
• Information sharing in a contest game with group identity
• On disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with stochastic entry
• Competitive disclosure of correlated information

Cites work

• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Disclosure policy in a multi-prize all-pay auction with stochastic abilities
• Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types
• Information sharing in private value lottery contest
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
• Private versus complete information in auctions
• Strategy and dynamics in contests
• The all-pay auction with complete information

Cited in

(5)

• A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information
• Information sharing in a contest game with group identity
• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
• Information acquisition in all-pay contests
• Optimal information disclosure in contests with communication

This page was built for publication: Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6170040)