Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:406429
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2014.03.003zbMATH Open1309.91073OpenAlexW1979914920MaRDI QIDQ406429FDOQ406429
Publication date: 8 September 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.003
Cites Work
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- All-Pay Contests
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
- Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
- Optimal advertising of auctions
- Competitive bidding and proprietary information
- Contests with productive effort
- Altruism and envy in contests: an evolutionarily stable symbiosis
Cited In (25)
- Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information and bid caps
- Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
- Bilateral \(k+1\)-price auctions with asymmetric shares and values
- A symmetric two-player all-pay contest with correlated information
- Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
- A simple model of competition between teams
- All-pay auctions with endogenous bid timing: an experimental study
- Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints
- Optimal information disclosure in contests with stochastic prize valuations
- Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry
- Information sharing decisions in all-pay auctions with correlated types
- An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium
- Asymptotic revenue equivalence of asymmetric auctions with interdependent values
- Optimal disclosure in all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
- Information Asymmetries in Common-Value Auctions with Discrete Signals
- Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
- Tullock contests may be revenue superior to auctions in a symmetric setting
- All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
- Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
- All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
- Harnessing beliefs to optimally disclose contestants' types
This page was built for publication: Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q406429)
