Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
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Publication:2013335
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.005zbMATH Open1393.91089OpenAlexW2598467885MaRDI QIDQ2013335FDOQ2013335
Jingfeng Lu, Sérgio O. Parreiras
Publication date: 17 August 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.005
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Cites Work
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- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
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- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
- Ex post information rents in sequential screening
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
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- Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
- Common-value contests with asymmetric information
Cited In (12)
- Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
- Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
- A simple model of competition between teams
- The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
- Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
- On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor
- A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions
- On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
- A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
- All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
- Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
- All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals
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