Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.005zbMATH Open1393.91089OpenAlexW2598467885MaRDI QIDQ2013335FDOQ2013335

Authors Jingfeng Lu, Sérgio O. Parreiras 

Publication date 17 August 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.005

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay auctionscontestsasymmetriescorrelated signalsinterdependent valuations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5032929
• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 482757 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1022658 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Common-value contests with asymmetric information
• Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
• Ex post information rents in sequential screening
• Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
• Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price

Cited In (14)

• Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for peace: implementability versus security
• Bayesian Nash equilibrium in all-pay auctions with interdependent types
• A simple model of competition between teams
• The role of the second prize in all-pay auctions with two heterogeneous prizes
• Non-monotoniticies and the all-pay auction tie-breaking rule
• On nondegenerate equilibria of double auctions with several buyers and a price floor
• A lower bound on seller revenue in single buyer monopoly auctions
• On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
• A model of a two-stage all-pay auction
• All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values
• Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests
• All-pay auctions with affiliated binary signals

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