Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.09.007zbMATH Open1203.91207OpenAlexW2048498254MaRDI QIDQ2268121FDOQ2268121
Authors: Sérgio O. Parreiras, Anna Rubinchik 
Publication date: 10 March 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.007
Recommendations
- Multi-player, multi-prize, imperfectly discriminating contests
- Three-player sequential contests with asymmetric valuations
- Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
- Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents
- Dynamics of three-agent games
- Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
- Contests with a stochastic number of players
- Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
- The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
- Multi-prize contests with expectation-based loss-averse players
contest as a game of incomplete informationmonotone equilibrium behavior in contest with observable effort
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)
Cites Work
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- All-Pay Contests
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
Cited In (31)
- Contests with a stochastic number of players
- Contests with a constrained choice set of effort
- Group size and group success in conflicts
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Simple equilibria in general contests
- Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
- A tug-of-war team contest
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests
- Large asymmetric first-price auctions -- a boundary-layer approach
- The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
- Risk taking in selection contests
- Equilibrium learning in simple contests
- The \(n\)-player Hirshleifer contest
- Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests
- Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
- Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
- Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints
- Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
- Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests
- Large contests without single crossing
- Dynamic contests with bankruptcy: the despair effect
- An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions
- Contest with pre-contest investment
- Contests with an uncertain number of prizes with a fixed total value
- Expectations-based loss aversion in contests
- Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs
- Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
- Divisionalization in contests
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