Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
This paper studies monotone equilibrium behavior in contest with observable effort where three or more participants have distinct risk attitudes and the monetary value for the prize of each is drawn independently from distinct distributions. These differences can either cause a player to drop out or use ``all-or-nothing strategies with discontinuous effort choice. Neither complete drop-out nor discontinuous bidding with finitely many gaps is consistent with pure strategy monotone Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in a contest with either exante identical players or only two distinct participants.
- Multi-player, multi-prize, imperfectly discriminating contests
- Three-player sequential contests with asymmetric valuations
- Multi-player contests with asymmetric information
- Mechanism games with multiple principals and three or more agents
- Dynamics of three-agent games
- Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests
- Contests with a stochastic number of players
- Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players
- The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes
- Multi-prize contests with expectation-based loss-averse players
- All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
- All-Pay Contests
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- Asymmetric Auctions
- Behavior in all-pay auctions with incomplete information
- Performance in Competitive Environments: Gender Differences
- Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
- Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
- Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
- Uniqueness and existence of equilibrium in auctions with a reserve price
- Contests with a stochastic number of players
- Contest with pre-contest investment
- Divisionalization in contests
- Gambling in contests with heterogeneous loss constraints
- Risk taking in selection contests
- Monotone equilibrium of two-bidder all-pay auctions redux
- A tug-of-war team contest
- The value of information in asymmetric all-pay auctions
- Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests
- Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences
- Simple equilibria in general contests
- Ex ante heterogeneity in all-pay many-player auctions with Pareto distribution of costs
- Contests with a constrained choice set of effort
- Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link
- Cumulative prospect theory preferences in rent-seeking contests
- Equilibrium learning in simple contests
- Intention-based fairness preferences in two-player contests
- An elementary proof of the common maximal bid in asymmetric first-price and all-pay auctions
- Expectations-based loss aversion in contests
- Large contests without single crossing
- Contests with an uncertain number of prizes with a fixed total value
- Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes
- Favoritism in asymmetric contests: head starts and handicaps
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations
- Dynamic contests with bankruptcy: the despair effect
- Large asymmetric first-price auctions -- a boundary-layer approach
- The n-player Hirshleifer contest
- Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers
- Equilibrium analysis of the all-pay contest with two nonidentical prizes: complete results
- Identification of incomplete information allocation-transfer games in monotone equilibrium
- Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests
- Optimal tree contest design and winner-take-all
- Invariant equilibrium in discontinuous Bayesian games
- Group size and group success in conflicts
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