Group size and group success in conflicts
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Publication:826634
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Cites work
- A simple model of competition between teams
- All-Pay Contests
- Asymmetric contests with general technologies
- Contests with group-specific public-good prizes
- Contests with three or more heterogeneous agents
- Group contest success functions
- Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
- Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 42530 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2021757 (Why is no real title available?)
- Non-deterministic group contest with private information
- Private-information group contests: best-shot competition
- Public goods, growth, and welfare
- Replicating contests
- Strategy and dynamics in contests
- The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups
- The paradox of power revisited: internal and external conflict
- The Structure of Utility Functions
- The theory of contests: a survey
Cited in
(7)- Pressure group size and the politics of income redistribution
- Malevolent governance, intra-group conflict and the paradox of the plenty: an experiment
- Contests between groups of unknown size
- Group size, collective action and complementarities in efforts
- Simultaneous inter- and intra-group conflicts
- Difference-form group contests
- On the inappropriateness of collective rent seeking analysis when agents exert within-group and between-group efforts
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