Contests with group-specific public-good prizes

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0226-3zbMath1142.91336OpenAlexW2022772217MaRDI QIDQ2467526

Kyung Hwan Baik

Publication date: 22 January 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0226-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Public goods (91B18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (29)

Best-shot versus weakest-link in political lobbying: an application of group all-pay auction ⋮ Optimal prize allocations in group contests ⋮ Group size and group success in conflicts ⋮ Group contest success functions ⋮ Defense against an opportunistic challenger: theory and experiments ⋮ Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups ⋮ Group Contest Success Function: The Heterogeneous Individuals Case ⋮ Group formation in a dominance-seeking contest ⋮ Is there free riding in group contests? ⋮ Contests between two groups for a group-specific public-good/bad prize ⋮ Prize sharing rules in collective contests: when do social norms matter? ⋮ The optimal sorting of players in contests between groups ⋮ Variable valuations and voluntarism under group selection: an evolutionary public goods game ⋮ The best-shot all-pay (group) auction with complete information ⋮ Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests ⋮ Contests between groups of unknown size ⋮ Non-deterministic group contest with private information ⋮ Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation ⋮ Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests ⋮ Rent-seeking for a public good with additive contributions ⋮ Contests with multiple alternative prizes: public-good/bad prizes and externalities ⋮ A simple model of competition between teams ⋮ The effect of limited search ability on the quality of competitive rent-seeking clubs ⋮ Group contests with private information and the ``weakest link ⋮ Private-information group contests: best-shot competition ⋮ Risk preference heterogeneity in group contests ⋮ Common-value group contests with asymmetric information ⋮ Sharing the effort costs in group contests ⋮ Strategic choice of sharing rules in collective contests

Cites Work

• Effort levels in contests. The public-good prize case
• Neutrality and the private provision of public goods with incomplete information
• The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games.
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project

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