Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
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Publication:989972
DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0434-0zbMATH Open1194.91065OpenAlexW3023829253MaRDI QIDQ989972FDOQ989972
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Cites Work
- Are four heads better than two? An experimental beauty-contest game with teams of different size
- Asymmetric contests with general technologies
- Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?
- Individual and group decision making under risk: An experimental study of Bayesian updating and violations of first-order stochastic dominance
- Individual or team decision-making--causes and consequences of self-selection
- On the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment: new experimental evidence regarding Linda
- On the existence and uniqueness of pure Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games
- Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions
- The gambler's fallacy and the hot hand: empirical data from casinos
- Two-stage contests with budget constraints: an experimental study
Cited In (13)
- That's the ticket: explicit lottery randomisation and learning in Tullock contests
- Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: cost structure and prize allocation rules
- Identifying types in contest experiments
- On the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study
- Level-\(k\) models and overspending in contests
- Defense against an opportunistic challenger: theory and experiments
- Learning and dropout in contests: an experimental approach
- Peace in an unequal world? Experimental evidence on the relationship between inequality and conflict in a guns-vs-butter setting
- An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
- Endogenous interdependent preferences in a dynamical contest model
- Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information
- Strategically equivalent contests
- Are individuals more risk and ambiguity averse in a group environment or alone? Results from an experimental study
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