Individual or team decision-making--causes and consequences of self-selection

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2005.08.009zbMath1177.91063OpenAlexW2078709238MaRDI QIDQ2507675

Matthias Sutter, Sabine Strauß, Martin G. Kocher

Publication date: 5 October 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.08.009

zbMATH Keywords

experimentbeauty-contest gameindividual decision-makingendogenous choiceteam decision-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (7)

Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered ⋮ Endogenous group formation and responsibility diffusion: an experimental study ⋮ Positioning of new brands in an experiment ⋮ Asymmetric guessing games ⋮ Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests? ⋮ Are individuals more risk and ambiguity averse in a group environment or alone? Results from an experimental study ⋮ Heterogeneity, inequity aversion, and group performance

Cites Work

• Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational players?
• Are groups more (or less) consistent than individuals?
• `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
• Are four heads better than two? An experimental beauty-contest game with teams of different size
• Barking up the right tree: Are small groups rational agents?
• The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Experimental `beauty contests' with homogeneous and heterogeneous players and with interior and boundary equilibria

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