Endogenous group formation and responsibility diffusion: an experimental study
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.02.003zbMATH Open1437.91138OpenAlexW3006562987MaRDI QIDQ2173387FDOQ2173387
Authors: Katharina Brütt, Arthur Schram, Joep Sonnemans
Publication date: 22 April 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.003
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group decisionssocial preferencesself-selectionendogenous group formationdiffusion of responsibility
Decision theory (91B06) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
Cites Work
- Individual or team decision-making--causes and consequences of self-selection
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- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- Individual and group behavior in the ultimatum game: Are groups more ``rational players?
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
- Group polarization in the team dictator game reconsidered
- A score based approach to wild bootstrap inference
- Efficient Coordination in Weakest-Link Games
- A Monte Carlo analysis of the Fisher randomization technique: Reviving randomization for experimental economists
- Shifting the blame: on delegation and responsibility
Cited In (4)
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