Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3065365
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2010.00608.xzbMath1202.91049MaRDI QIDQ3065365
Matthias Sutter, Stefan D. Haigner, Martin G. Kocher
Publication date: 5 January 2011
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence ⋮ FRAMING OF INCENTIVES AND EFFORT PROVISION ⋮ Democracy and resilient pro-social behavioral change: an experimental study ⋮ Game theory and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Does criminalizing discriminatory cultural practices improve women's welfare? A simple model of levirate marriage in Africa ⋮ The evolution of coercive institutional punishment ⋮ Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game ⋮ Endogenous group formation and responsibility diffusion: an experimental study ⋮ Vote and voice: an experiment on the effects of inclusive governance rules ⋮ Communication and visibility in public goods provision ⋮ Punishment strategies across societies: conventional wisdoms reconsidered ⋮ How special is democracy? An experimental study of recommendations in the minimum effort game ⋮ Does decentralization of decisions increase the stability of large groups? ⋮ Leading by example in a public goods experiment with benefit heterogeneity ⋮ Can priming cooperation increase public good contributions? ⋮ The team allocator game: allocation power in public goods games ⋮ When punishers might be loved: fourth-party choices and third-party punishment in a delegation game ⋮ The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation ⋮ A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity ⋮ The evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and optional participation ⋮ Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives ⋮ Tax-based pure punishment and reward in the public goods game ⋮ The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action ⋮ Fostering cooperation through the enhancement of own vulnerability ⋮ Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice ⋮ Probabilistic punishment and reward under rule of trust-based decision-making in continuous public goods game ⋮ Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible ⋮ Deterrence by collective punishment may work against criminals but never against freedom fighters ⋮ Social proximity and the erosion of norm compliance ⋮ Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma ⋮ Endogenous authority and enforcement in public goods games ⋮ Effects of majority-vote reward mechanism on cooperation: a public good experimental study ⋮ Of coordinators and dictators: a public goods experiment
