Can priming cooperation increase public good contributions?
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Recommendations
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Cites work
- "Coherent Arbitrariness": Stable Demand Curves Without Stable Preferences
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment
- Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
- Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
- Key-minimal cryptosystems for unconditional secrecy
- Smoothness and Convex Area Functionals—Revisited
- The importance of moral reflection and self-reported data in a dictator game with production
Cited in
(5)- Rehabilitation and social behavior: experiments in prison
- Another hidden cost of incentives: the detrimental effect on norm enforcement
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- Care and anger motives in social dilemmas
- Motives and comprehension in a public goods game with induced emotions
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