Communication and visibility in public goods provision

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.002zbMath1415.91080OpenAlexW2750175925MaRDI QIDQ2411531

Peter Twieg, Sherry Xin Li, Kevin A. McCabe, Ernan E. Haruvy

Publication date: 24 October 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

communicationexperimentspublic goodsvirtual worldsvoluntary contribution game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Uses Software

• Stata
• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Identities, selection, and contributions in a public-goods game
• Social distance in a virtual world experiment
• Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
• Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice1