Communication and visibility in public goods provision

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.08.002MaRDI QIDQ2411531zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sherry Xin Li, Peter Twieg, Ernan E. Haruvy, Kevin A. McCabe

Publication date 24 October 2017

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.08.002

zbMATH Keywords

communicationexperimentspublic goodsvirtual worldsvoluntary contribution game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental studies (91A90) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games
• The Mixed Effect of Voluntary Revelation: Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Game Experiments
• Framing and cooperation in public good games: An experiment with an interior solution
• Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice?
• A note on stochastic public revelation and voluntary contributions to public goods

Cites work

• Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
• Do actions speak louder than words? An experimental comparison of observation and cheap talk
• Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism
• Identities, selection, and contributions in a public-goods game
• Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
• Self-serving cheap talk: a test of Aumann's conjecture
• Separating the hawks from the doves: evidence from continuous time laboratory games
• Social distance in a virtual world experiment
• Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice1
• Testing for effects of cheap talk in a public goods game with private information
• Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent

Cited in

(4)

• Public information: relevance or salience?
• Private vs. public communication: difference of opinion and reputational concerns
• God games: an experimental study of uncertainty, superstition, and cooperation
• Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice?

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• Stata
• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

This page was built for publication: Communication and visibility in public goods provision

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2411531)