Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution mechanism

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Publication:817260

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.007zbMath1129.91316OpenAlexW3123582015MaRDI QIDQ817260

Louis Putterman, Christopher M. Anderson

Publication date: 8 March 2006

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://economics.brown.edu/sites/g/files/dprerj726/files/papers/2003-15_paper.pdf



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