Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments
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Publication:2268120
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.004zbMath1200.91106OpenAlexW2152277811MaRDI QIDQ2268120
Publication date: 10 March 2010
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://fbe.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/802712/1036.pdf
Related Items (7)
Conditional cooperation and framing effects ⋮ Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment ⋮ Belief heterogeneity and the restart effect in a public goods game ⋮ Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: comparison of centralized punishment institutions ⋮ Deconstruction and reconstruction of an anomaly ⋮ Continuous spatial public goods game with self and peer punishment based on particle swarm optimization ⋮ Public disclosure of players' conduct and common resources harvesting: experimental evidence from a Nairobi slum
Uses Software
Cites Work
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