Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment

DOI10.1016/j.amc.2023.128350MaRDI QIDQ6069368

Lei Shi, Tian Guo, Chunpeng Du

Publication date: 14 November 2023

Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationasymmetricpunishmentinterdependent networks

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91Axx) Mathematical economics (91Bxx) Genetics and population dynamics (92Dxx)

Cites Work

• Punishment does not promote cooperation under exploration dynamics when anti-social punishment is possible
• Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
• Self-adaptive win-stay-lose-shift reference selection mechanism promotes cooperation on a square lattice
• Direct reciprocity with costly punishment: generous tit-for-tat prevails
• Aspiration driven exit-option resolves social dilemmas in the network
• Evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game with extortion strategy under win-stay-lose-move rule
• Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
• Tit-for-tat or win-stay, lose-shift?
• The interface of unidirectional rewards: enhanced cooperation within interdependent networks
• Feedback, punishment and cooperation in public good experiments
• Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
• Statistical physics of human cooperation
• The Evolution of Cooperation

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