Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
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Publication:2139779
DOI10.1016/J.AMC.2022.127069OpenAlexW4221082220MaRDI QIDQ2139779FDOQ2139779
Publication date: 19 May 2022
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.13104
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- Enhancement of cooperation through conformity-driven reproductive ability
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- Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
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- Reputation-based investment strategy promotes cooperation in public goods games
- Conditional cooperator enhances institutional punishment in public goods game
- Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation
- Cooperation dynamics of polycentric climate governance
- Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation in a Corrupt Society with Anti-Corruption Control
Cited In (6)
- Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives
- Cost optimisation of individual-based institutional reward incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
- Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors for the evolution of cooperation
- Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment
- The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service
- The impact of labor subsidy, taxation and corruption on individual behavior
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