Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
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Cites work
- Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability
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- Cooperation dynamics of polycentric climate governance
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- Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a corrupt society with anti-corruption control
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
- Evolutionary dynamics with game transitions
- Exploring optimal institutional incentives for public cooperation
- Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
- How does resolution of strategy affect network reciprocity in spatial prisoner's dilemma games?
- Impact of reputation assortment on tag-mediated altruistic behaviors in the spatial lattice
- Punishing free-riders: How group size affects mutual monitoring and the provision of public goods
- Replicator dynamics for public goods game with resource allocation in large populations
- Reputation-based investment strategy promotes cooperation in public goods games
- Simulation of yeast cooperation in 2D
- Social exclusion with dynamic cost on the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- The evolution of cooperation
Cited in
(15)- The Singaporean model in public goods dilemmas with benevolent leaders and bribery
- Evolution of cooperation on interdependent networks: the impact of asymmetric punishment
- Cultural transmission and extortion
- Hierarchy, power, and strategies to promote cooperation in social dilemmas
- Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors for the evolution of cooperation
- Evolution of commitment in the spatial public goods game through institutional incentives
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a population with probabilistic corrupt enforcers and violators
- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a corrupt society with anti-corruption control
- Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control
- Corruption driven by imitative behavior
- How the expanded crowd-funding mechanism of some southern rural areas in China affects cooperative behaviors in threshold public goods game
- Cost optimisation of individual-based institutional reward incentives for promoting cooperation in finite populations
- Bribe and punishment: effects of signaling, gossiping, and bribery in public goods games
- The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service
- The impact of labor subsidy, taxation and corruption on individual behavior
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