Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2014.10.037MaRDI QIDQ2415756zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Karl Sigmund, Ulf Dieckmann, Yoh Iwasa, Joung Hun Lee

Publication date 23 May 2019

Published in Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/id/eprint/11532/1/LeeEtAl2014-corruptionA4.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bistabilityexploration-induced-equilibriuminformationline segments of equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

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Cites work

• Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare
• Graduated punishment is efficient in resource management if people are heterogeneous
• Punishment, counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment
• Runaway selection for cooperation and strict-and-severe punishment
• Self-organization for collective action: an experimental study of voting on sanction regimes
• Social control and the social contract: the emergence of sanctioning systems for collective action
• The calculus of selfishness.
• The coevolution of altruism and punishment: role of the selfish punisher
• The take-it-or-leave-it option allows small penalties to overcome social dilemmas
• Via freedom to coercion: the emergence of costly punishment

Cited in

(16)

• Bribery games on interdependent complex networks
• Games of corruption in preventing the overuse of common-pool resources
• Evolution of cooperation in a hierarchical society with corruption control
• The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor
• Zero-sum polymatrix games with link uncertainty: a Dempster-Shafer theory solution
• Modeling illegal logging in Brazil
• Waves of infection emerging from coupled social and epidemiological dynamics
• Effects of interconnections among corruption, institutional punishment, and economic factors on the evolution of cooperation
• Comparison between best-response dynamics and replicator dynamics in a social-ecological model of lake eutrophication
• Corruption and forest concessions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2156298 (Why is no real title available?)
• Fear induced explosive transitions in the dynamics of corruption
• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• The dynamics of corruption under an optional external supervision service
• Bidirectional supervision: an effective method to suppress corruption and defection under the third party punishment mechanism of donation games
• Evolutionary inspection and corruption games

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