Evolutionary inspection and corruption games

DOI10.3390/G7040031MaRDI QIDQ725050zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Stamatios Katsikas, Vassili Kolokoltsov, Wei Yang

Publication date 1 August 2018

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040031

zbMATH Keywords

noncooperative gamedynamic gameevolutionary gameinspection gamecorruption gameinspection budgetmultiple inspecteesmultiple violation levelspunishment fine

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22) Dynamic games (91A25)

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Cites work

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• A SEQUENTIAL ALLOCATION GAME FOR TARGETS WITH VARYING VALUES
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• An infiltration game with time dependent payoff
• An inspection game with multiple inspectees
• Applications of inspection games
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• Corruption suppression models: the role of inspectors' moral level
• Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
• Imperfect inspection games over time
• Inspection games in arms control
• Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds
• Mean-field-game model of corruption
• Recursive inspection games
• The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration
• The inspector's non‐constant‐sum game: Its dependence on a system of detectors
• The joy of \(x\). A guided tour of mathematics, from one to infinity
• Timely inspection and deterrence
• Understanding game theory. Introduction to the analysis of many agent systems with competition and cooperation.

Cited in

(16)

• Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis
• Fighting cheaters: how and how much to invest
• Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
• Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach
• An evolutionary approach to fraud management
• Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring
• Evolutionary, mean-field and pressure-resistance game modelling of networks security
• A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game
• A public contracting evolutionary game with corruption
• Bribery games on interdependent complex networks
• The emergence of deontological codes in public administration
• A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem
• The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration
• A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems
• Crime, punishment, and evolution in an adversarial game
• Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks

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