Evolutionary inspection and corruption games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:725050
DOI10.3390/G7040031zbMath1406.91039OpenAlexW2535661644MaRDI QIDQ725050
Stamatios Katsikas, Wei Yang, Vassili N. Kolokol'tsov
Publication date: 1 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040031
noncooperative gameevolutionary gamedynamic gameinspection gamecorruption gameinspection budgetmultiple inspecteesmultiple violation levelspunishment fine
Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05) Dynamic games (91A25) Evolutionary games (91A22)
Related Items (6)
Corruption and botnet defense: a mean field game approach ⋮ A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem ⋮ Evolutionary, mean-field and pressure-resistance game modelling of networks security ⋮ A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems ⋮ Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks ⋮ A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Corruption and power in democracies
- Mean-field-game model of corruption
- An inspection game with multiple inspectees
- Corruption suppression models: the role of inspectors' moral level
- Inspection games in arms control
- Imperfect inspection games over time
- Games of corruption: how to suppress illegal logging
- Inspection games with local and global allocation bounds
- Recursive Inspection Games
- An infiltration game with time dependent payoff
- A SEQUENTIAL ALLOCATION GAME FOR TARGETS WITH VARYING VALUES
- A remark on the customs and smuggler game
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- The Evolutionary Game of Pressure (or Interference), Resistance and Collaboration
- Efficient distributions of arms‐control inspection effort
- On some models of many agent systems with competition and cooperation
- A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game
- The inspector's non‐constant‐sum game: Its dependence on a system of detectors
- A generalized inspection game
- Timely inspection and deterrence
This page was built for publication: Evolutionary inspection and corruption games
