A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem

DOI10.1007/S10287-021-00416-6OpenAlexW3202498952MaRDI QIDQ2155222FDOQ2155222

Authors: Gianfranco Gambarelli, Daniele Gervasio, Francesca Maggioni, Daniel Faccini 

Publication date: 15 July 2022

Published in: Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-021-00416-6

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zbMATH Keywords

game theoryresource allocationStackelberg gamesinspection games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Evolutionary inspection and corruption games
• An amalgation of games
• Inspection games with long-run inspectors

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