A Stackelberg game for the Italian tax evasion problem

DOI10.1007/S10287-021-00416-6MaRDI QIDQ2155222zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gianfranco Gambarelli, Daniele Gervasio, Francesca Maggioni, Daniel Faccini

Publication date 15 July 2022

Published in Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10287-021-00416-6

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryresource allocationStackelberg gamesinspection games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Recommendations

• A stochastic game model of tax evasion
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• Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach

Cites work

• An amalgation of games
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Evolutionary inspection and corruption games
• Inspection games with long-run inspectors

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