A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems
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- A Differential Games Solution to a Model of Competition Between a Thief and the Police
- A Stackelberg Game to Optimize the Distribution of Controls in Transportation Networks
- A generalized inspection game
- A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non‐constant‐sum game
- An infiltration game with time dependent payoff
- Coordinating resources in Stackelberg security games
- Evolutionary inspection and corruption games
- Fare evasion in transit networks
- Game theory
- Leadership games with convex strategy sets
- Max flows in \(O(nm)\) time, or better
- Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity considerations
- New complexity results about Nash equilibria
- On generalized Stackelberg strategies
- Player aggregation in the traveling inspector model
- Randomized rounding: A technique for provably good algorithms and algorithmic proofs
- STATISTICAL CRITERIA FOR SEQUENTIAL INSPECTOR-LEADERSHIP GAMES
- Security and Game Theory
- Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games
- Solutions and properties of multi-stage Stackelberg games
- Timely inspection and deterrence
- Two-Person Zero-Sum Games for Network Interdiction
Cited in
(7)- Recursive inspection games
- Player aggregation in the traveling inspector model
- The traveling inspector model
- A two‐stage network interdiction‐monitoring game
- A sequential attribute sampling inspection game for item facilities
- When (not) to publicize inspection results
- Revisiting inspection game and inspector leadership through reaction networks
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