Timely inspection and deterrence

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(00)00082-5zbMath0979.90035WikidataQ127314284 ScholiaQ127314284MaRDI QIDQ5937359

Daniel Rothenstein, Ruldolf Avenhaus, Morton John Canty

Publication date: 25 February 2002

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

optimizationgame theorymodelinginspection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of mathematical programming (90C90) Reliability, availability, maintenance, inspection in operations research (90B25) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Deterrence, technology, and the sensible distribution of arms control verification resources ⋮ Evolutionary, mean-field and pressure-resistance game modelling of networks security ⋮ A sequential Stackelberg game for dynamic inspection problems ⋮ Playing for time: a sequential inspection game ⋮ A polynomial-time method to compute all Nash equilibria solutions of a general two-person inspection game ⋮ Evolutionary inspection and corruption games ⋮ Fire Code Inspection and Compliance: A Game-Theoretic Model Between Fire Inspection Agencies and Building Owners

Cites Work

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• Inspection games in arms control
• Minimax Policies for Unobservable Inspections
• The Upper Risk of an Inspection Agreement
• An infiltration game with time dependent payoff
• A remark on the customs and smuggler game
• A generalized inspection game

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