Evolutionary, mean-field and pressure-resistance game modelling of networks security
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Publication:2179036
DOI10.3934/JDG.2019021zbMATH Open1437.91056OpenAlexW2982361691WikidataQ126861885 ScholiaQ126861885MaRDI QIDQ2179036FDOQ2179036
Abstract: The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended model of interaction of large number of indistinguishable small players against a major player, with focus on the study of security and crime prevention. In this paper we introduce such a general framework for complex interaction in network structures of many players, that incorporates individual decision making inside the environment (the mean-field game component), binary interaction (the evolutionary game component), and the interference of a principal player (the pressure-resistance game component). To perform concrete calculations with this overall complicated model we work in three basic asymptotic regimes; fast execution of personal decisions, small rates of binary interactions, and small payoff discounting in time. By this approach we construct a class of solutions having the so-called turnpike property.
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Cited in
(6)- Sustainability of information security investment in online social networks: an evolutionary game-theoretic approach
- Many agent games in socio-economic systems: corruption, inspection, coalition building, network growth, security
- A Theory of Network Security: Principles of Natural Selection and Combinatorics
- The evolutionary game of pressure (or interference), resistance and collaboration
- Mean-field-game model for botnet defense in cyber-security
- Control theory approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games
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