Evolutionary, mean-field and pressure-resistance game modelling of networks security

DOI10.3934/JDG.2019021zbMATH Open1437.91056arXiv1808.06409OpenAlexW2982361691WikidataQ126861885 ScholiaQ126861885MaRDI QIDQ2179036FDOQ2179036

Authors: Stamatios Katsikas, Vassilli Kolokoltsov 

Publication date: 12 May 2020

Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended model of interaction of large number of indistinguishable small players against a major player, with focus on the study of security and crime prevention. In this paper we introduce such a general framework for complex interaction in network structures of many players, that incorporates individual decision making inside the environment (the mean-field game component), binary interaction (the evolutionary game component), and the interference of a principal player (the pressure-resistance game component). To perform concrete calculations with this overall complicated model we work in three basic asymptotic regimes; fast execution of personal decisions, small rates of binary interactions, and small payoff discounting in time. By this approach we construct a class of solutions having the so-called turnpike property.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.06409

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zbMATH Keywords

mean-field gameinspectionevolutionary gamecorruptioncyber-securitycounter-terrorismcrime preventionbot-net defensepressure-resistance game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43) Mean field games (aspects of game theory) (91A16) Computer security (68M25)

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Cited In (3)

• A Theory of Network Security: Principles of Natural Selection and Combinatorics
• Sustainability of information security investment in online social networks: an evolutionary game-theoretic approach
• Control theory approach to continuous-time finite state mean field games

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