Sustainability of information security investment in online social networks: an evolutionary game-theoretic approach

DOI10.3390/MATH6100177zbMATH Open1515.91131OpenAlexW2894227904WikidataQ129185495 ScholiaQ129185495MaRDI QIDQ6162000FDOQ6162000

Authors: Guang Zhu, Hu Liu, Mining Feng 

Publication date: 15 June 2023

Published in: Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/math6100177

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zbMATH Keywords

sustainabilityevolutionary gamefree ridingincentive mechanismonline social networkinformation security investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Passenger Profiling and Screening for Aviation Security in the Presence of Strategic Attackers
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Eigenvalues of dynamic max-min systems
• Evolutionary multiplayer games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Differential game-theoretic thoughts on option pricing and transaction costs
• A game theoretic model for the optimal location of integrated air defense system missile batteries

Cited In (2)

• An optimal group decision-making approach for cyber security using improved selection-drift dynamics
• Who should be responsible for software security? A comparative analysis of liability policies in network environments

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